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          1 Introduction
Which factors drive FDIs in the real world? An extensive literature has been
dealing with this question.1 From an empirical standpoint, it is well known that
the cross-country pattern of FDI may be well approximated by the “gravity”
relationship (Ekholm (1998), Shatz (2003)). Proximity variables like “physical
distance” or “sharing a common language” or “sharing a border” do contribute to
determine the size of bilateral FDI ﬂows between countries. Additionally, trade
barriers, the size of the market and the diﬀerence in factor costs are also found
to be signiﬁcant explanatory variables of FDIs.
However, proximity in “regulation” has never been taken into account as one
of the possible determinants of FDI. There are actually good reasons to think
that such a variable should matter. For instance, if regulations shape the eco-
nomic environment and the entrepreneurs are those agents that have the talent
to proﬁtably produce and sell goods in that environment, then a higher degree
of similarity among countries increases the chances that domestic entrepreneurs
are able to run businesses abroad in a proﬁtable way. The more the institutional
settings (or administrative rules, or safety and health regulations, or food regu-
lations, or any other kind of law that imposes to comply with some procedures)
are diﬀerent, the more costly the adaptation process to the new environment and
the smaller the incentives to actually run businesses abroad.
In order to give an empirical look at this issue, this paper exploits the OECD
indexes measuring the level of Product Market Regulation in a number of OECD
countries (Nicoletti et al. 2000), and the World Bank data set Doing Business
that collects information on business regulations and their enforcement in 145
countries. We match these data with the data on bilateral FDI ﬂows drawn from
the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics.
A ﬁrst check may be performed by simply plotting the diﬀerence between
countries regulation indexes against their bilateral FDI ﬂows.2 Graph 1 displays
on the horizontal axis the diﬀerence between country i and country j index of
Barriers to International Trade and Investment in the late 90’s, as measured by
the OECD, and on the vertical axis the ﬂow of FDI from country j to country
i (from 1980 to 1997). The graph shows that bulk of FDI ﬂows lies in the
area where the diﬀerence between regulations is close to zero. The smaller the
diﬀerence between regulations the larger and the more frequent the bilateral ﬂows
of FDI. Graph 2 displays a diﬀerent measure of regulation, namely Barriers to
Entrepreneurship, on the horizontal axis. On the vertical axis, as before, the
ﬂow of FDIs from country j to country i. Though maybe less evident, it still
seems that a smaller diﬀerence between regulations tends to be associated with
larger bilateral FDI ﬂows. Finally, in graph 3, we consider a third measure of
1See among others Horst (1972), Deardorﬀ, (1998), Ekholm (1998), Lipsey (2001), Razin et
al. (2003), Shatz (2003).
2For more details on the data and a proper empirical investigation see section 2.
2regulation: the extent of state control over business enterprises. Also this graph
has the same “triangular” shape of the two previous ones.
These graphs seem to suggest that FDIs do not ﬂow from more regulated
countries (where one would tend to think that the rewards from capital are low3)
to less regulated economies (where one would think that the rewards from capital
are high), otherwise we would observe much larger and frequent FDI ﬂows in the
area where the diﬀerence between the two indexes is negative, which does not
seem to happen. One explanation may be that the negative relation between
diﬀerences in regulations and FDI ﬂows is due to the fact that FDIs take place
mostly among (rich) non regulated countries that, for this reason, have similar
regulation levels. If this was case, what would actually foster bilateral FDIs is
not the regulation proximity between countries but, rather, their low regulation
levels.
However, the more robust - yet still preliminary - empirical analysis performed
in section 2 suggests that this is not the case. In that section we run a bunch of
regressions in the tradition of gravity models, adding as an additional explanatory
variable the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the source and host coun-
try indexes of regulation. Controlling for the level of regulation, for countries
ﬁxed eﬀects and for time eﬀects, we still ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the variable
capturing regulation proximity is, in a number of relevant cases, negative and
signiﬁcant. We interpret this ﬁnding as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that
the distance between nationwide regulations does contribute to shape the size of
bilateral FDI ﬂows.
This fact raises some questions. Why do diﬀerences in regulations matter at
all for FDIs once the levels are controlled for? Why do some countries have similar
regulation levels - and large bilateral FDI ﬂows - and others do not? Should we
expect these diﬀerences to be persistent? In “closed” countries, will there be
political support for changes in regulation that tend to favor FDI ﬂows? And in
more “open” countries, will there be political support to keep them open?
This paper will conﬁne itself only on the explanation of why regulation diﬀer-
ences seem to matter for FDIs and leave the other questions for further research.
In order to do so, we build a simple general equilibrium model of heterogeneous
agents that diﬀer in their abilities to be entrepreneurs or workers. Some of them,
the ones that have more managerial abilities, become entrepreneurs in a monop-
olistically competitive environment. The rest become workers. Entrepreneurs
may set up a ﬁrm abroad, i.e. engage in FDIs. We focus on horizontal FDIs,
i.e. investments aiming at establishing production facilities in a foreign country
3Unless, of course, regulated countries are poor countries with high marginal productivity
of capital.
3in order to serve the local market by making use of the local workforce.4,5
Setting up a ﬁrm abroad, however, requires incurring in a series of ﬁxed costs.
First, entrepreneurs operating in a foreign country are less eﬃcient than domestic
ones with the same level of entrepreneurial ability. We assume that this entails
hiring an extra amount of workers. The diﬃculty of monitoring workers abroad,
for instance, may be one reason for it. Second, FDIs give rise to a learning
cost that is to be borne when moving to the foreign country, because of the
need to learn how things work there. To the extent that regulation shapes the
economic environment and prescribes to follow certain procedures in order to
start a business, it is plausible to think that sharper diﬀerences in regulations
may actually impose a larger learning cost on foreign entrepreneurs willing to
engage in FDIs. Hence, we assume that entrepreneurs operating abroad need to
undertake a learning process and to incur a learning cost that is larger the larger
the diﬀerence in regulation between countries. Once the cost has been paid and
the learning process completed, the entrepreneur does not need to pay it ever
again. We model the learning cost as an extra amount of workers, decreasing
over time, to be hired in order to run the ﬁrm properly.
In this framework, only some entrepreneurs - the more able ones - eﬀectively
engage in FDIs. More similar regulations provide larger incentives to engage in
FDIs and a larger fraction of entrepreneurs will do so. This, in turn, increases the
labour demand, the output and the wage rate. As a consequence, the minimum
ability needed to become an entrepreneur goes up. This implies not only that
the total number of entrepreneurs goes down, but also that their composition
changes: a greater proportion of them engages in FDIs. More similar regulation
improve the allocation of talents: it deters less talented people from becoming
entrepreneurs by increasing the wage paid to workers. At the same time, even
if less people opt for an entrepreneurial career, a larger amount of them serve
clients abroad, implying that the variety of products that costumers may acquire
increases. Summarizing, more similar regulations imply larger FDIs, higher wages
and higher output. However, of course, not everybody gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
the results from the empirical investigation. Then, we turn to the model. Section
3 describes the demand and production sides of the model economy. Section 4
solves for the closed economy benchmark and section 5 analyses the framework
where entrepreneurs are allowed to set up ﬁrms abroad. Section 6 concludes.
4In other words, we consider goods that need to be produced in the same geographic location
where they are consumed. One can think of the ﬁrms providing services, like restaurants
(McDonald’s) or retail shops (Zara or H&M). We rule out both the licensing alternative (on
this see Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1987), and Ethier and Markusen (1996)) and
“vertical” FDIs, in which the production process is fragmented across countries (on this see
Helpman (1984), Helpman (1985), Markusen (2002, Ch. 9)).
5We also rule out trade. For a model of FDI and trade see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2003).
42 The empirical analysis: some preliminary ev-
idence
2.1 The Data
The ﬁrst aim of the paper is to understand whether, among the determinants of
FDIs, the cross-country distance between regulations may play some role. For
the sake of the empirical analysis, we exploit data on bilateral FDI ﬂows and
cross-country data on regulations (plus a set of control variables).
The data on FDIs are drawn from the OECD International Direct Investment
Statistics that provides yearly statistics for OECD countries on international
direct investment ﬂows (inﬂows, outﬂows) by geographical distribution, i.e. to
and from partner countries and regions from 1980 to 1997.6 Data are provided
in national currency and have been converted to US dollars using yearly average
exchange rates (OECD).
The control variables we employ are GDP, drawn from the OECD Main Eco-
nomic Indicators, population from the Penn World Tables, and a set of geograph-
ical variables that includes: latitude and longitude of the source and host country;
an adjacency dummy (i.e. if they share common land borders); a linguistic tie
dummy (i.e. if they share a common language); distance between (the main
cities of the) countries; European Union, North America and Asian dummies; a
NAFTA dummy. The geographical variables are drawn from Frankel, Stein and
Wei (1995) and Frankel and Wei (1998).
Finally, we exploit variables (ideally) capturing the level of diﬀerent types of
regulation implemented in diﬀerent countries. We use two sets of such variables,
one from the OECD and one from the World Bank.
The OECD data on regulation.
Nicoletti et al. (2000) builds indexes measuring the extent of Product Mar-
ket Regulation (and Employment Protection Legislation) in a number of OECD
countries during the 90’s.
The basic data used in the elaboration of these indexes come from (1) the re-
sponses of Member countries to an ad hoc questionnaire (The OECD Regulatory
Indicators Questionnaire) distributed to Member countries and the European
Union in 1998; and (2) from data on economy-wide and industry-speciﬁc regu-
lations drawn from publications of the OECD or other institutions. From these
sources, a number of detailed indicators of regulation were constructed and clas-
siﬁed in three broad regulatory domains:
• Barriers to international trade and investment.
6Actually the dataset arrives till 2001, but the last years are very noisy due to many missing
data.
5• Barriers to entrepreneurship.
• State control over business enterprises.
These three sets of variables are then summarized in a single measure of
Product Market Regulation. In addition, the last two indicators above are further
classiﬁed into the following alternative broad areas:
• Administrative regulations.
• Economic regulation.
Finally, regulatory provisions were classiﬁed as inward-oriented or outward-
oriented, depending on whether they are directed at domestic or foreign operators.
Figure 4 (in appendix, drawn from Nicoletti et al. (2000)) shows how the overall
index of Product Market Regulation was built starting from the raw data by fur-
ther aggregating the information in homogeneous domains. This process provides
us both with an overall index of Product Market Regulation, and with a set of
sub-indexes of regulations described above. Of particular interest to us are those
capturing mostly administrative burdens and red tape costs (like Administrative
regulations and Barriers to entrepreneurship), i.e. all those bureaucratic proce-
dures whose knowledge is an essential prerequisite in order to be able to set up
a ﬁrm in a (foreign) country. In what follows we will be exploiting the whole set
of sub-indexes. Though some of them are clearly highly correlated, others, like
Administrative regulations and Barriers to international trade and investment
display very low correlation (see Table 1 in the appendix).
The World Bank dataset ‘Doing Business 2004’.
The World Bank provides a comprehensive database, called Doing Business,7
collecting information on business regulations and their enforcement, especially
on small- and medium-size domestic ﬁrms, for 145 countries. The dataset we
exploit refers to January 2004.
The available indicators cover seven major areas, namely Starting a Business,
Hiring and Firing, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Investors,
Enforcing Contracts, and Closing a Business. For each of them diﬀerent indexes
are provided. Some indicators (like Number of procedures to register a business or
Index of employment law rigidity) aim at measuring the eﬀect of actual regulation
on businesses, while others (such as Time and cost to register a business, enforce
a contract, or go through bankruptcy) are measures of regulatory outcomes. Table
2, in the appendix, displays the full set of variables available.
Diﬀerently from perception-based surveys, the Doing Business dataset uses
factual information in order to measure the extent of regulation along several
7The dataset, as well as a detailed description of the variables, is available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness.
6dimensions. In particular, the dataset is built starting from an analysis of the
laws and regulations in force, that yields to a questionnaire designed for local
professionals experienced in their ﬁelds. The questionnaire is structured around
a hypothetical case to ensure comparability across countries and over time. Next,
the local experts engage in several rounds of interaction with the Doing Business
team. The preliminary results are presented to academics and practitioners, prior
to reﬁnements in the questionnaire and further rounds of data collection. Finally,
the data undergo numerous tests for robustness.
Of course, these measures of regulation are far from being perfect. At best
we would like to have time-varying information on whether regulations are qual-
itatively diﬀerent among countries rather than just quantitatively diﬀerent. In
particular, two countries that we classify as similar with these data, because they
require, say, the same number of procedure to start up a business, may actually
be diﬀerent because they require very diﬀerent tasks to be complied with. How-
ever, since quantitative diﬀerences in the amount of regulation plausibly come
together with qualitative diﬀerences, we may be conﬁdent that these data allow
to capture, at least partially, qualitative diﬀerences as well.
2.2 Results of the empirical analysis
In order to check whether the patterns highlighted by the raw data are robust
to a more severe empirical investigation, we run a bunch of regressions in the
tradition of gravity models, adding as additional explanatory variables both the
regulation level and the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the source and
host country indexes of regulation. Taking into account that, unfortunately, our
measures of regulation do not vary over time, we estimate the following model:
Fijt = αi + τt + Xijtβ + |regi − regj|γ + εijt (1)
where Fijt is the FDI ﬂow from country j (the source) to country i (the host)
at time t, as a share of GDP of the host country; αi is the ﬁxed host country
eﬀect; τt is a year eﬀect; the vector Xijt includes variables, such as the source and
host countries GDP (in US dollars); the source and host countries population;
the latitude and longitude of the source country;8 the distance between the main
cities of the two countries. A set of dummy variables is included as well in order
to control for the possibility that countries i and j share the same language; share
common land borders; they both belong to the European Union; are both located
in North America; are both located in Asia; they both belong to NAFTA. Finally
we also control for the regulation level. The vector β is the ceteris paribus eﬀect
of Xijt on Yijt.
8The latitude and longitude of the host country, as well as any other non time-varying
characteristic of the host country, are captured by the ﬁxed country eﬀect αi.
7Controlling for the level of regulation, the coeﬃcient of interest γ captures
exclusively the eﬀect of regulation proximity, as measured by the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between regulation indexes, on FDI bilateral ﬂows.
We perform our analysis on a set of 25 countries, for which we have data on
both regulation and FDI ﬂows, listed in Table 3 (see appendix). Tables 4, 5, 6
and 7 report the results of the estimation.
Table 4: results using the OECD regulation data
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1) obtained ex-
ploiting the OECD regulation variables. The columns (from A to I) report the
results of diﬀerent speciﬁcations diﬀering in the measures of regulation proximity
included on the right hand side. In column A we use the overall index of Product
Market Regulation and, up to column H, the diﬀerent sub-indexes of product
market regulation produced by the OECD and described in the earlier section.
In the last column we use the only time-varying index available, which measures
the strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (Nicoletti et al. (2000)). In
each speciﬁcation the regulation level (of the source country) is controlled for
by adding the regulation index with the lowest correlation with the one taken in
diﬀerences.
The table reports the coeﬃcient of the variable of interest, the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between regulation indicators, and shows that it is negative and
signiﬁcant in all but one speciﬁcations at least at the 5% level.9 The regula-
tion indicators that are arguably closer in spirit to the model presented in what
follows are the Barriers to Entrepreneurship, the Administrative Regulation and
the Employment Protection Legislation variables whose coeﬃcients are all nega-
tive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of the other variables, namely the extent of
State Control over Businesses, Economic Regulation, Barriers to Trade and In-
vestment, and both Inward- and Outward-Oriented Regulation are negative and
signiﬁcant as well.
Tables 5, 6 and 7: results using the World Bank regulation data
These tables report the results from the estimation of equation (1) using the
World Bank Doing Business 2004 dataset.10 Overall, out of the 24 indexes of
regulation proximity, half of them enter negatively and signiﬁcantly in equation
(1). In particular, Table 5 shows that the indexes measuring the distance in
regulations dealing with the processes of Starting a Business and of Hiring and
9In all speciﬁcations, GDP of both the host country and the source country is not signiﬁ-
cant. This is expected due to the inclusion of countries ﬁxed-eﬀect and the time trend. The
population of the source country enters always positively and signiﬁcantly. The EU dummy
and the common language dummy are always positive and signiﬁcant. See Razin et al (2004)
for comparable panel data results.
10In these tables, the level of regulation is accounted for by adding the OECD Overall Product
Market Regulation index.
8Firing are negative and signiﬁcant. Table 6, diﬀerently, seems to show that
similarities in regulations concerning Property Registration and the Credit system
do not aﬀect much FDI ﬂows. Finally, Table 7 suggests that, while diﬀerences
in the indexes of Investor Protection are not signiﬁcant, a larger distance in
the procedures related to Contract Enforcement does reduce the ﬂows of FDIs.
Finally, larger diﬀerences in the Bankruptcy procedures seem to actually foster
FDI.
Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that, at least along some dimensions,
diﬀerences in regulations may matter i.e., controlling for the regulation level, a
smaller distance between national regulations may actually foster bilateral FDI
ﬂows. In particular, we ﬁnd that some eﬀects on FDIs may be attributed to
regulations concerning Product Markets, the Labour Market (with some more
emphasis to be placed on ﬁring restrictions), and Contract Enforcement.
Notice that these regulations have to do and interact with the way an entre-
preneur has to set up a ﬁrm. For instance, product markets regulation may imply
the existence of particular start up procedures one needs to comply with in order
to start a business. Labour market and contract enforcement regulations may for-
bid (or allow only for) certain types of contractual arrangements to be stipulated
with workers and/or suppliers. Therefore, the diﬀerences between the regulation
indexes may be due to the fact that, in the two countries, diﬀerent sets of rules are
actually implemented, with whom any multinational-entrepreneur-to-be needs to
get acquainted with. It follows that if the diﬀerence between regulation indexes
grows large, the cost of setting up a ﬁrm abroad grows large as well, because
of the need to learn and understand a diﬀerent system of rules. This may be a
costly process that raises the cost of FDIs and reduces its attractiveness.
In what follows we formalize this idea. Next section presents the model econ-
omy.
3 The Model: Demand and Production
There are two political entities (countries). In each of them agents have Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences on the mass of products sold in their country, so that the
demand in one country for a certain good j is:
xj = Y p
−θ
j
where Y stands for aggregate demand in the country, θ is the constant demand
elasticity and pj is the price of the good. We normalize the price of the “aggre-
gate” good in each country to 1.
All goods are consumed in the country where they are produced. Entrepre-
neurs (who can be either national or foreigner) set up ﬁrms and face a monop-
olistic environment. All ﬁrms produce with constant returns to scale and using
9only labour. They maximize:
max
pj
pjxj − awxj = Y p
−θ
j (pj − aw)
a being the labour requirement for unit.
Thus the gross proﬁts (gross of ﬁxed costs, as explained below) and productive
labour demand (productive as opposed to total labour demand, as again explained


















In what follows we will assume without loss of generality that θ = 2 and
a = 1
4, so that the gross proﬁt and productive labour demand of a ﬁrm (any ﬁrm)








3.1 Entrepreneurs and net proﬁt
Agents are heterogeneous and diﬀer in their ability to run businesses. Each
agent faces a career choice. She has to decide whether to become a worker or an
entrepreneur. Agents choosing to become entrepreneurs set up a ﬁrm and produce
a good that enters symmetrically in the utility function of consumers, generating
the demand presented above. We assume that entrepreneurs-to-be need to pay a
ﬁxed cost in order to run their business. The ﬁxed cost takes the form of hiring
a number of workers κ, on top of the productive labour demand in equation
(3). The cost κ is going to be the source of heterogeneity and to determine who
becomes an entrepreneur and who becomes a worker. As standard, we assume
that no individual can be an entrepreneur and a worker at the same time.
When setting up a ﬁrm in the own country, the ﬁxed number of workers
required to start the production process is decreasing with the talent of the
individual, indexed by φ, i.e. κ = φ, with φ being distributed according to
some CDF F (φ). Therefore, the net beneﬁts and the total labour demand of a








w2 + φ = z + φ
It is useful to notice that:
Π = (z − φ)w
4 Closed Economy Equilibrium
In order to have a suitable reference and benchmark when we allow for cross-
border activity, we ﬁrst develop the equilibrium in a closed economy. At the
aggregate level the only relevant price is the wage rate. Given a certain wage,
agents are going to choose to become entrepreneurs if and only if:
w ≤ Π ⇔ φ ≤ z − 1
Assuming a continuum of agents of mass one, the number of agents that will
choose to be entrepreneurs is F (z − 1). Hence, labour supply and demand are:
LS (z) = 1 − F (z − 1) (4)




Notice that en lieu of expressing supply and demand as a function of prices,
we express them as a function of ﬁrms’ productive labour demand (z). We do
so for simplicity; z is a monotonously decreasing function of the wage rate, and
expressing everything in terms of z simplify matters enormously. An increase in
z means that labour has become relatively cheaper relative to Y (thus labour
demand goes up and supply down), and it is therefore convenient to think of z
as of how cheap labour is.
Equilibrium is attained when (1) career choices (being an entrepreneur or
not) are optimally taken; (2) the labour market clears (labour demand equals
the number of workers), and (3) aggregate demand equals the total income gen-
erated in the economy. We will refer to the last two conditions as labour market
equilibrium and goods market equilibrium.
4.1 Labour Market
In what follows we are going to maintain the hypothesis that φ (the inverse of
talent) is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. Hence, from (4), labour supply reads as
follows:
LS (z) = 2 − z





0 If z ≤ 1
1
2 (z − 1)(3z − 1) If 1 ≤ z ≤ 2
z + 1
2 If 2 ≤ z
In equilibrium it must be that 1 ≤ z ≤ 2, and therefore the condition that








There is a unique positive solution to this equation, whose value is denoted by ZA




10, which does not mean anything by itself). What is
interesting is that there exists a unique value of z that clears the labour market.
Moreover, z (how cheap is labour relative to the output of the economy) is the
only variable that determines the labour market behaviour. This property will
turn out to be very useful later on.
4.2 Goods market
In equilibrium, aggregate demand Y must be equal to the total output of the





plus the wage bill
(z × w), hence total output per ﬁrm equals 2zw.11 There are F (z − 1) ﬁrms,
thus the goods market equilibrium condition reads as follows:
Y = 2F (z − 1)zw
and therefore, any equilibrium price needs to be such that:
w = 2F (z − 1)
Keeping the assumption on the uniform distribution of talent φ ∼ U (0,1):
w = 2(z − 1)
Thus, z (how cheap it is labour) is all that is needed to completely characterize
the equilibrium. Moreover, in order to determine the value of z, it is enough to
clear the labour market. For later reference it is useful to observe that, given
our assumptions, the equilibrium values of wages and income are respectively
wA = 2(ZA − 1) = 2
3
√








11Gross proﬁts are split between entrepreneurs’ income and the ﬁxed costs.
125 The open economy
We now turn to a world where entrepreneurs are allowed to set up ﬁrms abroad,
i.e. engage in FDIs. In particular, we focus on “horizontal” FDIs, i.e. investments
aiming at establishing production facilities in a foreign country in order to serve
the local market by making use of the local workforce. In other words, we are
considering goods that need to be produced in the same geographic location where
they are consumed. One can think of ﬁrms providing services, like restaurants
(McDonald’s) or retail shops (Zara or H&M).
Engaging in FDIs implies the need to incur in additional ﬁxed costs. First,
we assume that due to, say, the diﬃculty of monitoring workers abroad, foreign
entrepreneurs are less eﬃcient than domestic ones (with the same level of talent).
This entails hiring an extra amount of workers γ. This assumption captures
the idea that running a business from a distant location somehow reduces the
proﬁtability of the activity.
Moreover, setting up a ﬁrm abroad requires incurring a further ﬁxed cost,
namely a learning cost. Such a cost is borne when moving to the foreign country,
because of the need to learn how things work there. This cost, as explained
in the introduction, may be generated by cultural diﬀerences (say language) or
diﬀerences in regulations (say, diﬀerent procedures to start up businesses) and is
larger the larger the diﬀerences between countries. An important point is that,
once an entrepreneur has paid the learning cost and learned how things work
abroad, she will never need to pay it ever again. We model the learning cost as
an extra amount of workers to be hired in order to run the ﬁrm properly equal to
δtλ, where t is the time elapsed since the foreign entrepreneur started producing
abroad, δ ∈ (0,1) measures the speed of learning (δ = 1 implies that one never
learns, while δ close to zero implies very fast learning), and λ is the size of the
cost.
Both δ and λ may depend on legislation, particularly on how diﬀerent legisla-
tions are. Our working assumption is going to be that changes in legislations or
procedures tending to make the countries more diﬀerent are bound to increase the
value of δ and λ (of either of them, or of both). However, changes in legislation
will not aﬀect evenly the entrepreneurs in the two countries. It is reasonable to
think that if the home country legislation changes, then the domestic and for-
eign entrepreneurs producing at home are able to adjust instantaneously to the
change. The only agents aﬀected are the foreign entrepreneurs that would like
to open a business in the home country. This asymmetry simply implies that if
an agent (independently of the nationality) has set up a ﬁrm in a country, she is
able to react faster to changes than agents not producing there.
Our interpretation of δ and λ is that they are the only visible consequence of
legislation, and are aﬀected only by changes in the distance between legislations.
Legislation per se, i.e. the legislation level, has no eﬀects in our model. In the real
world, of course, policies are most likely to have direct eﬀects as well, and some
13of them are going to be better than others. We are completely abstracting from
those eﬀects. This approach is consistent with the empirical analysis (presented
in section 2) where we do control for the regulation level.
5.1 Individual decisions
We conﬁne ourselves to steady state analysis and characterize the values of the
three possible career choices that each individual faces:
1. Be a worker.
2. Be a domestic entrepreneur.
3. Be an multinational entrepreneur.
In steady state, the value of being respectively a worker and a domestic en-









The above asset equations simply state that the values are equal to the present
discounted values of the future streams of wages and net proﬁts.
The value of being a multinational entrepreneur and having already learned
how the foreign country works, is:
VX = VN +
1
1 − β
(e z − φ − e γ) e w (8)
where the variables with a tilde refer to the foreign country. In equation (8) the
ﬁrst term of the right hand side is simply the value of being a domestic entre-
preneur while the second term is the value of being a multinational “educated”
entrepreneur, thus it accounts only for the extra ﬁxed cost e γ associated to FDIs
(and not for the learning cost).12
Finally, the value of starting to engage in FDIs, is:














12Notice that we need to assume that e z − z ≤ e γ − 1, in order to make sure that the set
of domestic entrepreneurs is non empty for any level of the learning cost. It seems both a
convenient and natural assumption, but it is disturbing because both z and ˜ z are endogenous.
In any case, later on we will concentrate on the symmetric case where the condition simpliﬁes
to 1 ≤ e γ.
14Where 1
1−βδλe w is the present discounted value of the learning cost. Given that
the cost decreases over time, no agent will produce abroad for some time only: if
an agent sets up a ﬁrm abroad, it is forever.
Heterogeneity. At the end of the day, there are two dimensions along which
individuals diﬀer. On the one hand they are more or less talented. On the other
hand, they may or may not have already engaged in FDIs.
5.1.1 Steady State Decisions
By making use of the above asset equations, we ﬁrst look at the decisions of the
individuals who have not been FDI entrepreneurs in the past and have therefore
not learned how things work in the foreign country. Then, we will analyse the
decisions of the agents who do know how foreign country legislation works.
• Individuals who have not engaged in FDIs,
– will be workers only if13
z − 1 ≤ φ
– will be domestic entrepreneurs only if
e z − e γ −
1 − β
1 − βδ
λ ≤ φ ≤ z − 1
– and will change their mind and do set a ﬁrm abroad only if




• Individuals who have been running a ﬁrm abroad in the past (or that for
any circumstances do not need to pay the learning cost) have a diﬀerent
decision scheme.
– They become workers only if:
z − 1 ≤ φ
– They become domestic entrepreneurs only if
e z − e γ ≤ φ ≤ z − 1
13The actual restriction is
max

z − 1,(z − 1)
w
w + e w
+







w + e w

≤ φ
but the assumption that e z − z ≤ e γ − 1 makes the wage in the other country irrelevant.
15– And continue being multinational entrepreneurs only if
φ ≤ e z − e γ
Notice that agents with φ ∈
h
(e z − e γ) −
1−β
1−βδλ,e z − e γ
i
will be engaging in FDIs
only if they have been doing so in the past, but will be domestic entrepreneurs
otherwise.
If in steady state any agent who could be a multinational entrepreneur is
actually one, then individuals will split up among the three categories according
to the following rules:
z − 1 ≤φ (Workers)
e z − e γ −
1 − β
1 − βδ
λ ≤φ ≤ z − 1 (Domestic entrepreneurs)




In order to simplify notation we deﬁne a variable C capturing the learning costs:
C =
1−β
1−βδλ. We now turn to analyse ﬁrst the labour market equilibrium condition
and then the goods market equilibrium condition.
5.2 Labour market
In a symmetric steady state countries have the same aggregate income Y and the
same wage rate w. The labour supply, in the home country, is given the total
number of individuals who choose not to be entrepreneurs of any type.
Ls = 1 − F (z − 1)
The labour demand in the home country is given by the sum (i) of the labour
demand of national entrepreneurs (ii) and the labour demand of foreign entre-




(z + γ + φ)dF (φ) +
Z z−1
0
(z + φ)dF (φ)
= [z + γ + E (φ|φ ≤ (z − (γ + C)))]F (z − (γ + C)) +
+(z + E (φ|φ ≤ (z − 1)))F (z − 1)
where
R (z−γ−C)
0 (z + φ + γ) is the labour demand of foreign producers that we
denote by L
f
D, and the second term
R z−1
0 (z + φ)dF (φ) is the labour demand of
domestic producers, denoted by Ld
D.
Notice that a drop in C aﬀects labour demand via two margins. On the one
side, a lower C induces a larger amount of foreigners to engage in FDIs, thus
16increasing the domestic labour demand (extensive margin). On the other side,
the marginal foreign entrepreneurs (and only the marginals) need to hire less
workers (intensive margin) because the ﬁxed cost C is lower.14 However, the net
eﬀect on labour demand of a decrease in C is clearly positive.15 Recalling that
talent is uniformly distributed (φ ∼ U (0,1)) and realizing that the number of
entrepreneurs that demand labour is bounded between zero and one:




[max{min{(z − (γ + C)),1},0}]





























0 If z ≤ 1
1
2 (z − 1)(3z − 1) If 1 ≤ z ≤ 2
z + 1








0 If z ≤ γ + C
1
2 (z − γ − C)(3z + γ − C) If γ + C ≤ z ≤ 1 + γ + C
z + γ + 1








is increasing in z (how cheap labour is).
The domestic labour demand is larger than the foreign if labour is relatively
expensive (low z), while if wages are low (high z) the foreign labour demand is
larger, because foreign ﬁrms need to have larger staﬀs to operate (γ > 0).
When z ≥ 2 labour is so cheap that all domestic agents want to be entre-
preneurs, at least locally. This, of course, cannot happen in equilibrium. When
14Notice that a larger C would aﬀect labour demand only through the extensive margin
because in that case a lower amount of foreigners would engage in FDIs, leaving unaltered the
labour demand of those who keep exporting.
15The ﬁxed cost γ aﬀects labour demand as well, ﬁrst by changing the proportion of foreign
agents who decide to produce in the home country (very much as the learning cost C ), and
second by aﬀecting the labour demand of all foreign producers (and not only the marginals).
17z ≥ 1+γ +C labour is even cheaper (recall that γ > 1) and therefore everybody
would like to engage in FDIs, which again cannot happen in equilibrium.
Let us now turn to what can happen in equilibrium. Given our assumption
that the cost of operating abroad is large enough (γ > 1), the shape of total
labour demand depends on the size of γ + C.
We ﬁrst analyse the case of a relatively high (γ + C > ZA). Notice that, in this
case, whenever z is lower than γ + C (labour is very expensive) the total labour
demand equals the domestic labour demand, which is equal to the autarchic
labour demand ZA. Thus, not surprisingly, for relatively high ﬁxed costs (and
relatively high means precisely that γ + C > ZA) the economy is de facto in
autarchy. This can be seen in ﬁgure 5. Foreign entrepreneurs demand labour in
the home country only if it is very cheap, z > γ + C, so their presence has no
eﬀect in equilibrium.
We now turn to the case where the costs of opening a plant abroad are not
so high (γ + C < ZA). The total labour demand is now, in the relevant range,
the sum of both domestic and foreign demand, as in picture 6. In that case, in
equilibrium, both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs hire labour in the home
country.
Since in equilibrium it can not happen neither than z > 1 + γ + C (because
then everybody would want to be a multinational entrepreneur) nor that z > 2
(because then everybody would want to be a domestic entrepreneur), the equi-
librium condition reads as follows:
LS = LD
(2 − z) =
1
2
(z − 1)(3z − 1) +
1
2
(z − γ − C)(3z + γ − C)






(1 + γ + 2c) +
q
(1 + γ + 2c)
2 + 6(γ − C)(γ + C) + 18





ZT (γ,C) Ifγ + C ≤ ZA
ZA Otherwise
Notice that when foreign producers actually hire in the home market, the labour
demand can never be smaller than in autarchy (see again ﬁgure 6), while labour
supply is not aﬀected by the possibility of cross-border investments. Thus it
is clear that, in any equilibrium with multinational entrepreneurs (i.e., whenever
γ+C < ZA), (1) labour is relatively more expensive (ZA ≤ ZT (γ,C)) and conse-
quently (2) the number of workers is larger (the number of entrepreneurs smaller)
than in autarchy.
18The mass of agents that become entrepreneurs is smaller in each country if, in
equilibrium, some agents (the more talented) invest across borders. This, anyway,
does not mean that the number of ﬁrms that sells to consumers is going to be
smaller, because entrepreneurs from both countries serve them.
5.3 Goods Market
In equilibrium, total production in each country must be equal to the income of
its inhabitants (either at home or abroad in the form of entrepreneurial rents), or
equivalently, the income generated in each country (independently of the country
of the earner) has to be equal to the total production, i.e.:
Y = F (z − 1)2zw + F (z − γ + C)2zw
which implies that:
w = 2 × [F (z − 1) + F (z − γ + C)]
Thus, the wage is a linear function of the number of entrepreneurs that oper-














It is not surprising that a larger learning cost determines a smaller equilibrium
number of foreign entrepreneurs. Less obvious is that this will reduce wages and
increase the gross proﬁts of ﬁrms. We plot the above functions for a particular
value of γ (γ = 1.1) in ﬁgure 7.16
A larger C reduces the wage rate because it induces some foreign producers
not to engage in FDIs. This reduces the domestic labour demand and the wage
rate. In turn, this will induce a positive proportion of domestic workers (the
more talented among them) to become (local) entrepreneurs, thus partially oﬀ-
setting the drop in labour demand. Despite this, the net eﬀect on the wage rate
is negative. So, overall, a larger C implies that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms are less
16Notice, however, that is is not really appropriate to make comparative statics. We need to
be careful and interpret this exercise as the comparison of the steady states of two (pairs of)
countries with diﬀerent values of C.
19eﬃcient. The foreign producers expelled are actually very eﬃcient: their φ was
low enough to induce them to move in spite of the extra ﬁxed costs associated to
foreign operations. Additionally, with lower cross-the-border investments, even
if the number of persons that become entrepreneur in each country increases,
the number of entrepreneurs from which any individual may buy goes down.
Dixit-Stiglitz love for variety implies then that less “openness” lowers eﬃciency.
Notice that this decrease in variety is a direct consequence of the entrepreneurs
being less productive (and thus requiring more workers) in an economy with high
learning costs. Trade (low learning costs) is (behind the veil of ignorance) welfare
improving because it improves the allocation of talent.
Moreover, in case of a larger C, the aggregate demand is lower, so that the





could in principle move in any direction. Nevertheless,
the eﬀect of wages is undoubtedly larger, meaning that the gross proﬁts would be
larger if C were larger. Actually, also the net proﬁts of the local producers (that
keep being local, i.e. do not start engaging in FDIs) would be larger, because
their ﬁxed costs φ do not depend upon the learning cost, and, being wages lower,
the total ﬁxed cost φw goes down, thus making the increase in net proﬁts larger
than the increase in gross proﬁts.
As to foreign producers, the eﬀect of the would-be exercise of considering
a larger C is clear. Producers engaging in FDI are already acquainted with the
foreign environment and thus bear no direct eﬀect of having a larger C. However,
to the extent that general equilibrium eﬀects take place through the wage rate, gross
proﬁts would be larger for them as well.
Finally, a larger C would imply that the proﬁts of the entrepreneurs that start
engaging in FDIs would be lower, because the negative direct eﬀect of C on net
proﬁts more than oﬀsets the increase in gross proﬁts.
The four functions object of this discussion (wage rate, local entrepreneurs
proﬁts, multinational entrepreneurs proﬁts, and proﬁts of becoming a multi-




This paper has ﬁrst presented evidence on the eﬀect of countries proximity in
regulation on bilateral FDI ﬂows. By exploiting the OECD International Direct
Investment Statistics and data on nationwide regulation levels from the OECD
and the World Bank, we ﬁnd evidence that smaller diﬀerences in countries regu-
lations tend to be associated with larger bilateral ﬂows of FDIs, even controlling
for the level of regulation, for countries ﬁxed eﬀects and for time eﬀects, in the
context of a gravity model.
Motivated by this evidence, we build a general equilibiurm model trying to
explain why diﬀerences in regulations may aﬀect bilateral FDI ﬂows. In the
20model agents are heterogeneous and diﬀer in their abilities to be entrepreneurs
or workers. Entrepreneurs may set up a ﬁrm abroad, i.e. engage in FDIs. If they
do so they incur in two additional ﬁxed cost, one of which is the cost of learning
the foreign regulation, which increases in the distance between regulations.
In this framework, more similar regulations foster FDI and improve the allo-
cation of talents in the economy. Wages, output and productivity go up.
The mechanism is as follows. Only the more able entrepreneurs engage in
FDIs, and their fraction grows larger the “easier” it is to set up a ﬁrm abroad,
i.e. the more similar the regulations. This, in turn, increases the demand for
domestic labour, output and wages. As a consequence of the latter eﬀect, the
minimum ability needed to become an entrepreneur goes up. This implies that
the total number of entrepreneurs goes down while the composition changes: a
greater proportion of them engages in FDIs. Hence, more similar regulations
improve the allocation of talent by deterring less talented people from becoming
entrepreneurs by increasing the wages paid to workers. At the same time, even
if less people opt for an entrepreneurial career, a larger amount of them serve
clients abroad, implying that the variety of products that costumers may acquire
increases.
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γ + C < ZA
which implies that C < 1 and γ + 1 > 2, therefore γ + 1 − C > 0.
Proof. Next, we prove that
∂w(C)
∂C < 0, where
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Which is negative if




















(1 + γ)C (10)
Which is true since (1 + γ)
2 must be smaller than (1 + ZA)
2 = 5.6997 and the right hand
side is larger than 6.
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the above expression is negative since, as shown above:
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the above is negative since the expression in square brackets
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may be rewritten as follows
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2, which holds true by (10).































Figure 1: Diﬀerence between country i and country j Barriers to international
































Figure 2: Diﬀerence between country i and country j Barriers to entrepreneurship































Figure 3: Diﬀerence between country i and country j state control over business
enterprises against the the ﬂow of FDI from country j to country i (1980-1997).
Figure 4: The OECD Product Market Regulation indicators. From Nicoletti et
al. (2000)
28Table 1: Correlations between the OECD Regulation Subindexes
PMR State B. Ent. B. T&I Ec. reg. Ad. reg. Inw. Outw.
PMR 1
State Control 0.86 1
Bar. Entrep. 0.54 0.42 1
Bar. T&I 0.76 0.45 0.03 1
Econ. reg. 0.84 0.98 0.47 0.4 1
Admin. reg. 0.49 0.36 0.97 0.01 0.38 1
Inward reg. 0.85 0.89 0.79 0.37 0.90 0.73 1
Outward reg. 0.82 0.52 0.1 0.99 0.47 0.08 0.40 1
29Table 2: Variables of the World Bank dataset Doing Business 2004
Starting a Business Number of procedures
Average time spent during each procedure (in calendar days)
Oﬃcial cost of each procedure (% of income per capita)
Paid-in minimum capital (as a percentage of income per capita)
Hiring and Firing Diﬃculty of hiring index
Rigidity of hours index
Diﬃculty of ﬁring index
Rigidity of employment (average of the three above)
Firing costs (number of weeks)
Registering Property Number of procedures
Number of days
Oﬃcial cost (% of property value per capita)
Getting Credit Cost to create and register collateral (% of income per capita)
Index of legal rights of borrowers and lenders
Index of credit information availability
Coverage of public registry (borrowers per 1000 capita)
Coverage of private registry (borrowers per 1000 capita)
Protecting Investors Disclosure of ownership and ﬁnancial information index
Enforcing Contracts Number of procedures
Number of days
Oﬃcial cost (% of the debt value)
Closing a Business Number of years
Oﬃcial cost (% of estate)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Fixed costs are large (γ + C > ZA)




















Figure 7: γ = 1.1. Gross proﬁts, wages and output
Figure 8: φ = 1
2,γ = 1.1. Dotted line: wage rate. Diamond line: local entre-
preneurs proﬁts. Solid line: multinational entrepreneurs proﬁts. Thick solid line:
proﬁts of becoming a multinational entrepreneur.
37